Attorney and Client - Practitioners Not Admitted or Licensed to Practice - Civil Liability to Injured Third Parties by Rohde, Paul E.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 34 Number 1 Article 5 
1958 
Attorney and Client - Practitioners Not Admitted or Licensed to 
Practice - Civil Liability to Injured Third Parties 
Paul E. Rohde 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rohde, Paul E. (1958) "Attorney and Client - Practitioners Not Admitted or Licensed to Practice - Civil 
Liability to Injured Third Parties," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 34 : No. 1 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol34/iss1/5 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. 
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
1958] RECENT CASES 63
RECENT CASES
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT - PRACTITIONERS NOT ADMITTED OR LICENSED To
PRACTICE - CIVIL LIABILITY TO INJURED THIRD PARTIES. - Defendant, who
was a notary public and not a licensed attorney, drew up a will for decedent
which left all of decedent's property to the plaintiff. The will was not ad-
mitted to probate because of insufficient attestation. Plaintiff brought action
for damages and received judgment. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal
held, that the defendant acted as an attorney when he drew the will, in
violation of a statute limiting practice to members of the State Bar. This
violation permitted the plaintiff to recover the difference between the amount
she would have taken, had the will been valid, and the amount actually
distributed to her. Biakania v. Irving, 310 P.2d. 63 (Cal. 1957).
The practice of law is not limited to the preparation of cases and their
presentation in court. It includes legal advice and counsel and the drawing of
instruments when such instruments set forth, limit, claim, or grant legal
rights.1 A layman may prepare only instruments such as simple deeds, mort-
gages, promissory notes, and bills of sale, provided he has an interest in the
transaction out of which they arise, and provided no charge is made therefor.2
One may, however, be guilty of the practice of law without a license even
though he receives no fee.-'
The layman is apt to view the efforts of the various Bar Associations, aided
by the courts and state legislatures, in the suppression and prosecution of
unauthorized practice, as efforts of self-preservation for the benefit of the
Bar alone. This view is wrong, and finds no sanction either in reason or fn
authority.4 The purpose of the various unauthorized practice statutes is to
protect the public against exploitation by incompetent and unqualified prac-
titioners. 5
The unauthorized practice of law has been punished by: indictment and
prosecution, 6 contempt proceedings,- injunction proceedings,8 quo warranto
proceedings9 and the withholding of compensation. 10 Since the court, in the
1. See Cain v. Merchant's National Bank & Trust Co., 66 N.D. 751, 268 N.W. 719,
723 (1936). This definition appears to be one of the best of the many available. See also,
Agran v. Shapiro, 12 Cal. App.2d 807, 273 P.2d 619, 622 (1954); State ex rel. Laughlin
v. Washington State Bar Ass'n., 26 Wash.2d 914, 176 P.2d 301, 309 (1947).
2. Petitions of lngham County Bar Ass'n., 342 Mich. 214, 69 N.W.2d 713 (1955);
Cain v. Merchants National Bank & Trust Co., 66 N.D. 751, 268 N.W. 719 (1936).
3. State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 131 Neb. 294, 268 N.W. 95 (1936).
4. See Hicks & Katz, Unauthorized Practice of Law 2 (1934); Foreword by Mr. John
C. Jackson, Chairman of the Committee on Unauthorized Practice, American Bar Ass'n.
5. See Lowe v. Presley, 86 Ga. App. 328, 71 S.E.2d 730 (1952); Chicago Bar Ass'n.
v. Kellogg, 338 11. App. 618, 88 N.E.2d 519 (1949); Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn.
468, 48 N.W.2d 788 (1951).
6. See People v. Schreiber, 250 111. 345, 95 N.E. 189 (1911); People v. Alfani, 227
N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919); State v. Chamberlain, 132 Wash. 520, 232 Pac. 337
(1925).
7. See People ex rel. Attorney General v. Castleman, 88 Colo. 207, 294 Pac. 535
(1930); Bump v. District Court of Polk County, 232 Iowa 623, 5 N.W.2d 914 (1942);
In re White, 54 Mont. 476, 171 Pac. 759 (1918).
8. See Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 254 N.W. 910 (1934); Dworken v.
Apartment House Owner's Ass'n., 38 Ohio App. 265, 176 N.E. 577 (1931); Paul v.
Stanley, 168 Wash. 371, 12 P.2d 401 (1932).
9. See Berk v. State, 225 Ala. 324, 142 So. 832 (1932); State ex cel. Boynton v.
Perkins, 138 Kan. 899, 28 P.2d 765 (1934).
10. See Hardy v. Sin Fernando Valley Chamber of Commerce, 99 Cal.App.2d 572,
222 P.2d 314, 317 (1950); Harris v. Clark, 81 Ind.App. 494, 142 N.E. 881 (1924).
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instant case, decided that the defendant acted as an attorney and not as
a scrivener, 1 the case, as decided, appears to admit to little controversy.
A civil action for damages by an injured third party is thus added to the
list of liabilities to which a layman practicing law subjects himself.12
The requirement of privity of contract and the classification of a legatee
under a will as an incidental beneficiary, present vast bulwarks to an intended
beneficiary seeking recovery from a negligent draftsman. As the court points
out in the instant case, "to say that only the testator has been wronged is
contrary to fact and legal fiction."'3 It is submitted that the injured legatee
should be protected by holding the negligent draftsman, whether layman or
attorney, liable in an action based on contract or tort.
PAUL E. ROBDE
CONSTITUTIrONAL LAW - PROCESS OR NOTICE - IN PERSONAMI JUDGIENT ON
PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS OUTSIDE STATE NOT DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
- Defendant, a resident of Wisconsin, was engaged in the business of selling
appliances. He was personally served with a summons in that state by
plaintiff, a resident of Illinois, who alleged injuries caused by defendant's
agent in delivering a stove to plaintiff in Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court
held that the 1955 amendments to Section 17 of the Illinois Civil Practice
Act,1 which authorize the entry of a judgment in personam on personal serv-
ice of summons on a nonresident outside the state, does not violate the 14th
11. Compare the instant case with Mickel v. Murphy, 305 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1957) :n
which the court held that the defendant acted as a scrivener and not as an attorney, and
was therefore not liable in a tort action, for negligent preparation of a will.
12. It is an interesting contrast to note that there is no such liability in the case of a
negligent attorney, no matter how great his negligence. See Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195
(1879) (Defendant was employed by X to examine and report on X's title to certain
property. He certified the title to be good and the property unencumbered, while actually
X had previously conveyed away the property by duly recorded conveyance which de-
fendant, with a reasonable degree of care, could have ascertained. Plaintiff, in reliance upon
this certification,-loaned money to X, who became insolvent, and sought recovery from
defendant. The court held that, there being neither fraud, collusion nor falsehood by the
defendant, nor privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant, he was not liable to
plaintiff for any loss sustained by reason of the defective certificate.) In Buckley v. Gray,
110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895), defendant was employed by plaintiff's mother to draw
a will, by the terms of which the plaintiff and a brother were to share equally
in her estate, to the exclusion of the children of a deceased brother. Defendant had plain-
tiff sign as a subscribing witness, thus rendering the provisions of the will void as to the
plaintiff, and permitting the deceased brother's children to take one-half of the estate.
Plaintiff brought action to recover for the attorney's' negligence, but the court held, that
an attorney is liable for negligence in the conduct of his professional duties, arising only
from ignorance or want of care, to his client alone, that is, to the one between whom
and the attorney the contract of employment and service existed, and not the third oarties.
The only exceptions arise where the attorney has been guilty of fraud, collusion, or a
malicious or tortious act.
13. 310 P.2d 63, 68 (Cal. 1957).
1. Ill. Ann. Stat. § 17 (1955) "Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of
this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated,
thereby submits his person, . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any
cause of action arising from . . . the transaction of any business within this State; the
commission of a tortious act within this State; the ownership, use, or possession of any
real estate situated in this State; or contracting to insure any person, property or risk lo-
cated within this State at the time of contracting. Service of process . . . may be made by
personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside this State, with the same force
and effect as though . . . served personally within this State."
